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Religion and Land Use: Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal
April 21, 2004
John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, the Director of its Joint
Center for Land Use Studies, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies. Ms. Bacher is Staff Attorney for the Land Use Law Center at
Pace University School of Law.]
Abstract: The Westchester Day School and the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) of the
Village of Mamaroneck were involved with several lawsuits stemming from a rescinded
“negative” State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) determination by the ZBA
after local public outcry of the school’s expansion. This article explores the relationship
between Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and land use
regulations, and comes to the conclusions that Congress enacted the RLUIPA to ensure
religious organization landowners are not singled out to bear the burdens of the general
public.
***
Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), involved a Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) challenge to the denial of an application by an Orthodox Jewish day school
for modification of its special permit. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment overturning the denial and ordering the issuance of the permit. In October
2001, Westchester Day School (“WDS”) submitted an application for modification of its
special permit to allow construction of a new classroom building and renovation of two
existing buildings to accommodate its student population. After several months of
public hearings and collecting comments from professionals, the Zoning Board of
Appeals (“ZBA”), the board responsible for issuing the permit modification, unanimously
voted to issue a “negative declaration” under the State Environmental Quality Review
Act, finding that no significant adverse environmental impacts would result. “Shortly
thereafter, an outcry of community opposition arose and … the ZBA voted unanimously
to hold a rehearing to review its ‘negative declaration’ determination.” Westchester Day
School v. Village of Mamaroneck, 236 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Following
the rehearing and additional public hearings, the ZBA voted to rescind the negative
declaration. Id.
WDS sued the village of Mamaroneck, the ZBA and its members (the “village”)
for placing unconstitutional burdens on its right to expand and improve the school and
sought relief under RLUIPA. The court ruled that the rescission of the “negative
declaration” was invalid because it was not based on “any change in the Project or any
new evidence, but in response to belated public outcry”, and therefore the “negative

declaration” was “still in full force and effect.” Id. at 359. In light of it’s holding, the court
did not address the RLUIPA claims.
After the court’s order, the ZBA held several public hearings and participated in a
conference before the court. At the court’s request, the ZBA gave the WDS a list of
outstanding issues that might impede the issuance of the modification to the special
permit and the WDS responded to all issues. Following an additional two months of
deliberations, the ZBA voted 3-2 to adopt a resolution denying WDS’s application in its
entirety.
The WDS again sued the village claiming that the denial constituted a substantial
burden of its religious freedom in violation RLUIPA. Westchester Day School v. Village
of Mamaroneck, 280 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). RLUIPA prevents federal, state
and local governments from “imposing or implementing land use regulation in a manner
that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise”. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). If
a prima facie case is established, the government must demonstrate that its regulation
furthers “a compelling governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive measure of
furthering that interest.” Id.
The WDS claimed that the denial of its application violated RLUIPA because the
existing buildings are not large enough and too decrepit to serve all of its students and
carry on its mission of religious instruction: a matter involving the free exercise of their
religion. The village challenged the constitutionality of RLUIPA claiming that RLUIPA
does not merely enforce a constitutional right, Free Exercise, but defines it, a power
reserved for the courts.
The district court held “RLUIPA does not ‘contradict vital principles necessary to
maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.’” The court found that RLUIPA
narrowly focuses on “low visibility decisions” such as land use actions that risk
“idiosyncratic application.” Westchester Day School, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (citing
Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware County v. Township of Middletown, 204 F. Supp.
2d 857, 873-4 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). The court also held that RLUIPA is a permissible
exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because its power over
economic activity is broad and that “religious buildings actively used as the site for a full
range of activities” affect interstate commerce. Id. at 238. The court concluded that
RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment Clause or the Tenth Amendment.
Once the court established the constitutionality of RLUIPA, it determined that the
denial of the application violated the Act. As required by the Act, WDS made a prime
facie showing that RLUIPA had been violated by establishing that the village’s denial of
its application “(1) imposes a substantial burden; (2) on the ‘religious exercise’; (3) of a
person, institute or assembly.” Id. at 239. A substantial burden under the Act is
established when a regulation “compel[s] action or inaction with respect to a sincerely
held belief; mere inconvenience to the religious institution or adherent is insufficient.”
Id. at 240. The court concluded “the denial is a substantial burden on [WDS’s] exercise
of religion because the modifications WDS seeks will enable it, for well into the

foreseeable future, to more efficiently, effectively and, most importantly, safely serve its
student population and fulfill its religious and educational mission.” Id. at 243.
Having established a prima facie case, the burden shifted to the village to
demonstrate that the regulation furthers a compelling government interest and that it is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest. The village argued that
the permit modification would negatively impact traffic and parking conditions in the
neighborhood. However, the court found that “traffic concerns have never been
deemed a compelling government interest” and nothing was presented to show that lack
of parking spaces “will result in direct and immediate threat to public, health, safety or
welfare.” Id. at 242. Finding no issues of material fact, the court granted WDS motion
for partial summary judgment on its RLUIPA claim and set aside the ZBA’s denial of
WDS’s application. The case is currently before the Second Circuit for review.
Background of RLUIPA
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Employment Division Services v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), that the government need not show a compelling basis for
burdening a religious organization or person engaged in obeying religious dictates when
it imposes a facially neutral requirement of general applicability. This meant that laws of
general applicability, like zoning codes, would be analyzed under the lenient rational
basis test. This decision prompted religious and political groups to lobby Congress to
restore the religious protections the Smith decision had removed, in their opinion
Three years later, the Supreme Court, in Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993), ruled that Smith applies only when the law is
both neutral and generally applicable, and “a law failing to satisfy these requirements
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.” This ruling did not appease those that sought to overturn Smith
and, in that same year, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). RFRA applied a strict scrutiny test to all laws
burdening religious practice.
In the City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court struck
down the sweeping, popularly supported RFRA statute as an attempt by Congress to
interpret the substantive rights protected by the Constitution and to decide cases and
controversies, a power reserved to the courts. Justice Kennedy writing for a 6-3
majority, labeled RFRA’s strict scrutiny language “the most demanding test known to
constitutional law,” which in this context reflects “a lack of proportionality or congruence
between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved.” Id. at 534.
Congressional hearings attending the adoption of RFRA had not revealed recent
evidence of laws targeting religious practice or motivated by discriminatory intent.
“RFRA,” Kennedy wrote, “was designed to control cases and controversies, such as the
one before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond
congressional authority, it is this Court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.” Id.
at 536.

In response to Boerne, Congress adopted the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) which was more narrowly focused than RFRA
and which was based on significant fact finding by Congress. According to the hearing
record - “[c]hurches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are
frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly
individualized and discretionary processes of land use regulation.” It found that recent
trends in the manner that Americans worship have resulted in increased disputes over
the application of local zoning ordinances to religious uses of property. These findings
are significant because, as the Boerne court admitted, Congress may enforce
Constitutional guarantees when it has "reason to believe that many of the laws affected
by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional."
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
RLUIPA applies to local land use decisions that involve individualized
assessments of proposals by religious institutions for a variety of permits and approvals.
It requires local governments to implement land use regulations in a manner that treats
religious assembly or institution on equal terms, is nondiscriminatory, and does not
exclude or unreasonably limit religious assembly within a jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc (2000).
The Westchester Day School case is one of a number of recent federal court
cases that involve challenges to local land use decisions. In Civil Liberties for Urban
Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit
interpreted the application of RLUIPA’s substantial burden requirement narrowly holding
that the time and expense required to meet land use permit requirements cannot
constitute a violation because such a finding “would require municipal governments not
merely to treat religious land uses on an equal footing, but rather to favor them in the
form of an outright exemption from land use regulations.” Id. at 762. In the opinion of
the Urban Believers majority, the outcome of RLUIPA challenges will rest on whether
the court interprets RLUIPA’s substantial burden element broadly, subjecting any
burden to the strict scrutiny test, or narrowly limiting applicability to burdens that render
religious exercise “impracticable”. Id. at 761.
To date, there are no federal appellate court rulings on the constitutionality of
RLUIPA as that statute deals with the protection of land use as religious exercise. The
few district court cases that have ruled on the constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Land Use
provisions have addressed the “individualized assessment” jurisdictional element, which
invokes Congress’s power under the Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Commerce Clause jurisdictional element.
In Freedom Baptist Church of Delaware
County, the court ruled that RLUIPA's provisions are more narrowly directed than those
of RFRA. 204 F. Supp. 2d at 873-4. RLUIPA is confined to the Spending and
Commerce Clauses, except for those cases where the government makes individual
assessments, and this is consistent with Smith. “[T]he statute draws the very line Smith
itself drew when it distinguished neutral laws of general applicability from those ‘where
the State has in place a system of individual exemptions,’ but nevertheless ‘refuses to

extend that system to cases of “religious hardship.”’” Id. (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at
884). In contrast, the court in Elsinore Christian Ctr. v. City of Lake Elsinore, 291 F.
Supp. 2d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2003) held that RLUIPA does more than codify the Supreme
Court’s “individualized assessment” jurisprudence and exceeds the scope of the
Commerce Clause because it regulates land use laws and not economic activity. The
Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it
does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate
commerce. According to the Elsinore court, “[b]ecause Section 2(a) of RLUIPA
regulates the way States regulate private parties, Congress's Commerce Clause
authority is an inappropriate basis upon which to predicate its enactment.” Id. at 1104.
Conclusion
The lesson learned from the Westchester Day School case has to do with
fairness. The courts have exhibited hostility to locals land use decisions that single out
particular land owners to bear particular burdens that are not based on facts on the
record of the proceedings, or that respond solely to citizen opposition. In adopting
RLUIPA, Congress was concerned that vociferous opponents hold too much sway in
decisions on individual land use applications by religious institutions. The Westchester
Day School court was moved by evidence that the Mamaroneck ZBA’s denial was not
based on any compelling governmental interest or on a fair balancing of environmental
concerns with the rights of WDS to the reasonable use of its property and that
defendants’ abrupt reversal of its prior approval and its 3-2 vote to deny plaintiff’s
Application was a reaction to belated public outcry, a paradigm of what has been
referred to as the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome. Westchester Day School,
280 F. Supp. 2d at 243.

